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WHY DON’T GENERAL COUNSELS STOP
CORPORATE CRIME?
S. Burcu Avci & H. Nejat Seyhun*
Corporate fraud is costly, involving hundreds of billions of dollars in
lost reputational and out-of-pocket costs for stakeholders and hundreds of
thousands of job losses for employees, suppliers, and customers. To
prevent fraud, general counsels are charged with the responsibility of
gatekeeping in the corporation. They understand the law and they are
expected to use their legal expertise to advise on, intervene in, and report
suspicions of fraud. In spite of their legally-mandated central role,
corporate counsels typically do not appear to discover any corporate
wrongdoing, at least they are not the ones reporting it. In this paper, we
analyze the potential reasons why corporate counsels keep silent in the face
of potential wrongdoing in their own firms and propose policy
recommendations to better protect shareholders’ interests against selfdealing by top management.
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1. See Alexander Dyck et al., How Pervasive is Corporate Fraud? 2-3 (Aug. 2014)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://www-2.rotman.utoronto.ca/facbios/file/Pervasive.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U3QR-DM6Y] (estimating that in the 1996-2004 period, one out of seven
large, publicly traded companies engaged in fraud and the average cost of fraud was $380
billion per year).
2. See Mike Spector, Michigan Won’t Discipline Lawyers in GM Ignition Case, THE
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/michigan-won-t-disciplinelawyers-in-gm-ignition-case-1459080002 [https://perma.cc/2BEX-6RFP] (linking the GM
ignition scandal to 124 deaths).
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
4. See Accounting Scandals: The Dozy Watchdogs, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 11, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21635978-some-13-years-after-enron-auditorsstill-cant-stop-managers-cooking-books-time-some
[https://perma.cc/UQ92-JC4N]
(suggesting that the failure of audits to prevent managers from cooking of books might
mean that reforms are necessary).
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Corporate fraud is costly. It involves the loss of hundreds of billions
of dollars in reputational and out-of-pocket costs for corporations,
shareholders, bondholders, and other stakeholders, as well as hundreds of
thousands of lost jobs for employees, suppliers, and customers.1 In some
cases, it has also resulted in the loss of lives and environmental disaster.2
More than ten years after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in
2002,3 which was designed to make corporations more transparent, more
accountable, and therefore less likely to engage in corporate fraud, largescale, corporate scandals show no sign of abating.4 Recent high-level, postSOX additions to corporate scandals include the General Motors ignition
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failure,5 the Volkswagen emissions fraud,6 the British Petroleum Deepwater
accident,7 the LIBOR rate-rigging by large banks,8 the options backdating
scandals involving over 100 companies,9 and the foreign exchange fixing
scandals by some large banks, just to name a few.10 Many of these scandals
already have, or are expected to, result in multi-billion dollar settlements.11
What all of these scandals have in common is the failure of the top inhouse corporate attorney, the corporate general counsel (“GC”), to discover
the institutional dysfunction, fraud, and/or cover-ups; thus, corporate GC
failed to either prevent the corporation from sliding into fraud and criminal
wrongdoing or simply report the wrongdoing before it grew. Why didn’t
the top corporate attorneys in these and other cases stop the fraud or blow
the whistle on these frauds, cover-ups, and illegal activities? This is the
key question we try to address in this article.
SOX was the federal government’s response to growing corporate
fraud around the turn of the century involving Enron, WorldCom, Tyco,
Arthur Andersen, Adelphia, Global Crossing, and others. These cases
convinced lawmakers that the institutional arrangements for detecting and

05/11/2017 10:58:06
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5. For more information on the GM ignition failure scandal, see GM Ignition, LIEFF
CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTIEN, LLP, http://www.lieffcabraser.com/Personal-Injury/CarAccidents/GM-ignition-defect-recall.shtml [https://perma.cc/R9CF-L3TF] (last visited Mar.
16, 2017). See also Spector, supra note 2 (discussing how some victims also sued GM’s top
lawyers).
6. For more information on the Volkswagen scandal, see Russell Hotten, Volkswagen:
The Scandal Explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business34324772 [https://perma.cc/R9NP-P6BF].
7. For more information on the British Petroleum Deepwater scandal, see Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://response.restoration.
noaa.gov/deepwater-horizon-oil-spill [https://perma.cc/J6BC-A226] (last visited Mar. 16,
2017).
8. For more information on the LIBOR scandal, see James McBride, Understanding
the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., http://www.cfr.org/united-kingdom/
understanding-libor-scandal/p28729 [https://perma.cc/7JGR-4JYY] (last updated Oct. 12,
2016).
9. For more information on the options backdating scandal, see Frank Ahrens,
Scandal Grows Over Backdating of Options, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 12, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/11/AR2006101100425.
html [https://perma.cc/883X-Z4HA]. See also Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The
Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2006), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB114265075068802118 [https://perma.cc/4WTR-P3EP].
10. For more information on the FX fixing scandal, see Sebastian Chrispin, Forex
Scandal:
How
to
Rig
the
Market,
BBC NEWS
(May
20,
2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26526905 [https://perma.cc/2ZUD-ZDVM].
11. See Michael Ono, 8 High-Profile Financial Scandals in 5 Months, ABC NEWS
(Aug.
17,
2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/high-profile-financial-scandalsmonths/story?id=17023140 [https://perma.cc/9FGF-J8Q8] (detailing the costliness of the
financial sector scandals).
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preventing corporate fraud were inadequate and required strengthening.
Consequently, SOX was quickly passed to enhance reporting requirements,
strengthen the independence of the board of directors, and increase civil
and criminal sanctions for violations.12
SOX also designated corporate attorneys as special gatekeepers. SOX
imposed requirements on corporate attorneys to report any suspicion of
violation to the chief legal officer or chief executive officer, and if
receiving an inadequate response from these officers, to report to the board
of directors to stop any potential wrongdoing.13 More than any other
executives in the corporation, corporate attorneys are well-versed in law,
and are therefore expected both to recognize legal violations and to use
their legal expertise to advise on, intervene in, and stop wrongdoing.
In spite of these reforms enacted in SOX and the explicit provisions
and responsibilities given to corporate attorneys, most of the whistleblowing in cases of corporate fraud come from employees (17%), nonfinancial market regulators (13%), and the media (13%).14 Clearly absent
from this list are top in-house corporate counsels. In this paper, we
investigate the potential reasons for the failure of corporate counsels to
report and prevent corporate crime.
We formulate two mutually exclusive hypotheses to characterize GCs’
actions. The first hypothesis is that fraudulent, top-level executives
intentionally keep corporate counsel out of the informational loop.15 As a
result, in-house lawyers are generally unaware of the developing violations
and therefore unable to report and prevent fraud.16 Thus, corporate counsel
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12. See William H. Donaldson, SEC Chairman, Testimony Concerning Implementation
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sept. 9, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/
090903tswhd.htm [https://perma.cc/XE55-KSTG] (explaining the reasoning behind SOX).
13. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2014) (“If an attorney, appearing and practicing
before the Commission in the representation of an issuer, becomes aware of evidence of a
material violation by the issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or agent of the issuer,
the attorney shall report such evidence to the issuer’s chief legal officer (or the equivalent
thereof) or to both the issuer’s chief legal officer and its chief executive officer (or the
equivalents thereof) forthwith.”).
14. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN.
2213, 2226 (2010).
15. As a case in point, according to the Examiner’s Report, WorldCom CEO Bernard
Ebbers simply lied to the GC, Michael Salsbury, that the board approved Intermedia merger
agreement when, in fact, the board had not. Third and Final Report of Dick Thornburgh,
Bankruptcy Court Examiner at 399, In re WorldCom, Inc., 377 B.R. 77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2007).
16. WorldCom attorneys Michael Salsbury and Bruce Borghardt appear to fall in this
category. Id. at 378 (“The legal function at WorldCom was decentralized, with no in-house
counsel, including former General Counsel Michael Salsbury and Bruce Borghardt, former
General Counsel for Corporate Development, charged with responsibility to ensure that
proper corporate governance processes were followed. The Examiner concludes that an
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institutional and organizational defect, rather than failings by particular individuals,
contributed to the Company’s injuries in this area.”).
17. Corporate counsel can also take part in illegal activity, independent of top
management. On February 5, 2016, Herbert Sudfelt, an attorney for Fox-Rothchild, was
convicted of insider trading after he purchased Harleysville stock prior to a merger
announcement and made approximately $79,000 in illegal profits. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
LITIGATION RELEASE NO. 23461, Defendant in SEC Insider Trading Action Found Guilty by
Federal Jury in Philadelphia in a Related Criminal Case (2016), https://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23461.htm [https://perma.cc/52WU-CSQN].
18. Enron attorneys Stuart Zisman and Jordan Mintz appear to fall in this category of
attorneys who do not escalate their suspicions of violations. See Lisa H. Nicholson, SarbOx
307’s Impact on Subordinate In-House Counsel: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 559, 601-03 (2004) (discussing that while both attorneys wrote
memorandums warning that some large transactions appeared as balance sheet
manipulations, their warnings were ignored and neither attorney chose to escalate his
suspicions to the board of directors).
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cannot fulfill their gatekeeping role because they simply do not have
enough information about the potential wrongdoing.
A second hypothesis is that in-house corporate counsels participate in
the planning, creation, execution, or cover-up of the fraud alongside other
top management. This hypothesis states that corporate counsels are
typically not only present at the scene of the crime, but they also help
create the crime; thus they are well aware of the crime and subsequent
cover-up. In this case, corporate lawyers would have no incentive to report
the fraud since they would be turning themselves in by reporting it.17
A possible third, middle-ground hypothesis is that some corporate
lawyers do become marginally aware of the violations but either have
incomplete information or worry about retaliation if they report the
violation, and thus they prefer to keep silent and do not escalate their
suspicions.18 Since this scenario places the corporate lawyers outside the
fraudulent group, we combine them with the group in the first scenario
because they do not have sufficient information about the true extent of the
corporate wrongdoing.
Each of these potential explanations has different implications for
corporate governance and different potential remedies to address corporate
fraud. If the first hypothesis (exclusion) is true, then potential remedies
might include providing greater access to top-level corporate decisionmaking authority to the GC. This can include automatic mandated
membership in the top decision-making executive committees of the
corporation in addition to membership on the board of directors, as well as
the GC’s written approval for financial statements and other major
corporate initiatives. If the second hypothesis (instigators and/or aid-andabettors) is true, then whistle-blowing protections for GCs might be
strengthened to encourage GCs not to be tempted into fraud in the first
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19. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012) (detailing that employers may not discharge,
demote, suspend, threaten, or harass any officer or employee because that person provided
information of fraud within the company).
20. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
21. Insiders can also legally trade even at a time when they have material, nonpublic
information if they set up a 10b5-1 trading plan before they become aware of the material
information. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2014).
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place. This might include an explicit Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) rule stating that corporate counsel are covered by the whistleblowing protections that are available to other employees.19 Additional
regulatory responses might include removing the exemption granted to
corporate counsel by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)
of 199520 and allowing a private right of action for noncompliance of SOX
provisions against GCs.
We test these hypotheses by examining insider trading by top-level
executives as well as GCs before, during, and after the class period in firms
involved in securities class action (SCA) settlements. We also compare
insider trading in firms with SCA settlements with those firms that were
not involved in SCA settlements. We use insider trading simply to infer
the information possessed by the insiders. We assume that this insider
trading is not illegal per se.21
If GCs are uninformed about a violation until the whistleblowers
reveal the fraud, then we would not expect GCs to be heavy sellers of their
own firms’ stocks during the class period, as compared to the control
periods before and after the class periods. Similarly, if the GCs are outside
the fraudulent group and they are only marginally aware of some of the
violations, they are not likely to know the full extent of the fraud. In
addition, they may be afraid to report it due to fear of retaliation. In this
case, we again would not expect the GCs to sell their own firms’ stocks.
Finally, if the second hypothesis is correct and GCs are part of the
fraudulent group, we would expect them to behave similarly to the other
top-level executives and to sell their own firms’ stocks before the fraud is
revealed, and thus benefit from the fraudulent cover-ups.
Our evidence shows that GCs generally behave similarly to other toplevel executives. They are heavy sellers of their own firms’ stocks during
the class periods, and thus they profit abnormally by avoiding the stock
price declines upon revelation of the fraud at the end of the class periods.
Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the GCs are part of the
fraudulent group, and therefore the hypotheses should be treated the same.
We suggest that policy responses to corporate fraud should include creating
a separate gatekeeper counsel that reports directly to independent board
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members instead of the CEO and additional penalties for GCs, including
potential disbarment and allowing for a private right of action for fraud
against GCs. A third policy response can include mandated hiring of
outside legal-audit firms similar to financial-audit firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews
the related literature on the role of corporate lawyers, corporate fraud
identification, and revelation. Section 2 contains information about our
data and methodology. Empirical results are discussed in Section 3. Our
policy recommendations to reduce corporate wrongdoing are in Section 4.
Finally, we discuss our conclusions.
I.

LITERATURE REVIEW

A. Corporate counsels as gatekeepers
Corporate attorneys perform multiple functions for their clients. The
first, traditional role of an attorney is that of an advocate whose main duty
is to vigorously represent the client.22 In addition to this function, corporate
attorneys play a second role as transaction engineers—planning, designing,
and negotiating particular transactions for their corporate clients.23 In this
role, corporate lawyers act as planners, educators, legal advisors,
investigators, and representatives of the client.24 In fact, every legal
document a corporation prepares is drawn up by a lawyer.25 Corporate
attorneys’ third role is that of a verification specialist, drafting and
verifying the completeness and accuracy of disclosure documents in
conjunction with new security issuances, mergers, and acquisitions.26 This

05/11/2017 10:58:06
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22. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)
(outlining the duty of a lawyer to his client and to the legal system); JOHN C. COFFEE JR.,
GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 192 (2006) (noting the shift
in role of the attorney from a gatekeeper for his client to a gatekeeper “for parties other than
the attorney’s direct client”).
23. See COFFEE, supra note 22, at 192-93.
24. See id. (discussing the various roles of lawyers that qualify them as gatekeepers);
see also Sarah Selene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in Promoting
Corporate Integrity and Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 989, 1002-12
(2007) (exploring the traditional lawyering and quasi-legal roles of attorneys); see also
Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing
the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 463-66
(2000) (reviewing the roles of lawyers as cops, counsel, and entrepreneurs in corporate
settings).
25. See 148 CONG. REC. S6524 (daily ed. Jul. 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi) (“[I]n
almost every transaction there was a lawyer who drew up the documents involved in that
procedure.”).
26. See COFFEE, supra note 22, at 192-93.
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third function is also referred to as the due-diligence function.
While performing these functions, corporate attorneys also interact
with the general public, investors, and regulators. Moreover, their
decisions affect not only their own clients, but also their clients’
employees, suppliers, customers, investors in the firm’s securities,
taxpayers, and thus society at large. As a result of the wide-ranging
implications of attorneys’ work, it has been held by some that the attorneys
also owe a duty to “do justice” to society as well.27 Thus, the attorneys’
role as gatekeepers also refers to their responsibilities to society.
The idea that attorneys owe an ethical obligation to society at large to
“do justice” goes back to the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Canons
of Ethics from the early twentieth century.28 While stated as an ideal, this
responsibility to society at large clearly conflicts with attorneys’ obligation
as an advocate for their clients. While the ABA has resisted instituting a
gatekeeping responsibility for attorneys or corporate counsel, over time, as
a result of the numerous financial scandals involving attorney misconduct,
the gatekeeping function of the corporate counsel was gradually
institutionalized and tightened. Finally, SOX legally mandated the strictest
gatekeeping requirements for corporate counsels.

B. SOX and gatekeeper corporate counsels

C M
Y K

05/11/2017 10:58:06

27. Id. at 193 (distinguishing between the duties of a litigator and a corporate lawyer in
relation to their clients).
28. The ABA’s 1908 Canon 30 stated that a “lawyer’s appearance in Court should be
deemed equivalent to an assertion on his honor that in his opinion his client’s case is one
proper for judicial determination.” Id. at 200.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002); see also 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003) (stating that the purpose
of 15 U.S.C. § 7425 is to set minimum standards for the conduct of attorneys).
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245(1)-(2) (2002) (requiring that the commission issue rules
mandating attorneys to report illegal conduct to higher authorities).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2003).
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Section 307 of SOX directed the SEC to adopt “minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys.”29 Section 307 expands the coverage to
outside and in-house attorneys and defines an “up-the-corporate ladder”
reporting responsibility if the in-house attorney finds material violation of
laws within the company.30 What constitutes a “material violation” is
defined vaguely in the law, thus creating ambiguity and subjectivity. The
Act defines evidence of material violation as “credible evidence, based
upon which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a
prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely
that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.”31
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When an attorney suspects that there is material evidence of a violation, she
shall report the violation to the chief legal officer or chief executive officer.
If she does not get an appropriate response in a reasonable time, she shall
go up the ladder to the audit committee. Alternatively, the attorney may
satisfy the duty to report by reporting the violation to a qualified legal
compliance committee (QLCC) of the company..32
Section 806 of SOX provides legal protections against discharge or
other discrimination to whistle-blowing employees.33 The law also allows
the whistleblowers to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor or with
the appropriate district court.34 What is not so clear, however, is whether
protections of Section 806 extend to GCs. The issue is whether GCs are
considered employees for the purpose of Section 806 or if they are
considered a part of the management team. This issue has not been
clarified so far.35
Consequently, SOX added to this structure of formal duties of GCs a
new, fourth responsibility as whistleblowers. The new rules require GCs to
investigate any reported potential violation and to inform the top
management so that management can take the necessary steps to stop the
violation, or further to escalate the reporting to a compliance committee,
audit committee, or board of directors of the corporation.36 What SOX did

C M
Y K

05/11/2017 10:58:06

The chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) shall cause such inquiry into
the evidence of a material violation as he or she reasonably believes is
appropriate to determine whether the material violation described in the report
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur. If the chief legal officer (or the
equivalent thereof) determines no material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or
is about to occur, he or she shall notify the reporting attorney and advise the
reporting attorney of the basis for such determination. Unless the chief legal
officer (or the equivalent thereof) reasonably believes that no material violation
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, he or she shall take all reasonable
steps to cause the issuer to adopt an appropriate response, and shall advise the
reporting attorney thereof. In lieu of causing an inquiry under this paragraph (b),
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32. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.5(c)-(d) (2003) (requiring subordinate attorneys to comply
with the reporting requirements under 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) and (c)). If the lawyer cannot
get appropriate response from the QLCC, she has to quit her job and explain the reasons of
quitting to the SEC. This process is called “noisy withdrawal provision.” This is the last
resort for a lawyer. Noisy withdrawal is enabled by Section 307 of SOX (15 U.S.C.
§ 7245); however, it has never been put into effect by the SEC.
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012) (providing civil right of action to protect against
retaliation in fraud cases).
34. See id. § 1514A(b) (stating that a whistleblower may seek relief by filing a
complaint to the Secretary of Labor).
35. See Kim T. Vu, Conscripting Attorneys to Battle Corporate Fraud Without Shields
or Armor? Reconsidering Retaliatory Discharge in Light of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 209, 212-13 (2006) (noting that precedent implies that attorneys are not employees, yet
SOX applies to employees only).
36. Rule 205.3(b)2 states:
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not do is address how this fourth duty interacts with the three traditional
roles and responsibilities of corporate attorneys.
While SOX is explicit about whistleblowing (reporting) requirements
for corporate attorneys,37 it is pretty much silent on the potential effect of
whistleblower responsibilities on their strong advocacy responsibilities.
Gatekeeping requires monitoring company activities to discover and
prevent misconduct before it happens.38 Gatekeeping responsibilities
include advising, advocating, and educating all corporate officers of
potential legal consequences of their actions.39 Clearly, it is difficult for the
same person who is required to be a whistleblower (a confrontational role)
to advise, inform, and represent (an advocacy role) at the same time.40
SOX also does not address the potential conflict between other duties
of the attorneys in their management roles. Conceptually, it is difficult for
GCs who are now part of the top management team to monitor and report
on top managements’ wrongdoings.41 The more GCs act like top
a chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) may refer a report of evidence of
a material violation to a qualified legal compliance committee under paragraph
(c)(2) of this section if the issuer has duly established a qualified legal
compliance committee prior to the report of evidence of a material violation.
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17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2003).
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002) (requiring the Securities and Exchange Commission
to establish a rule to require attorneys report violations at the companies for which they
work).
38. See generally Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of
Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) (discussing the role of gatekeepers in lowering the
cost of legal controls).
39. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2169, 2180 (2004) (noting that lawyers are tasked with advising corporations on their legal
obligations); Duggin, supra note 24, at 1003-20 (describing the functions of GC); Henning,
infra note 59, at 360-61 (describing the various advising and reviewing functions that
lawyers serve in a corporation); Tanina Rostani, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance:
Preliminary Findings and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 466-67
(2008) (describing compliance functions served by corporate programs).
40. See Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, supra note 39, at 2180
(recognizing attorneys’ “dual, and often conflicting, tasks of advising corporations on their
legal obligations and monitoring compliance with those obligations”); Duggin, supra note
24, at 1030 (debating the difficulties an attorney faces when they are witness to damaging
information); see also Henning, infra note 58, at 352, 356 (noting the difficulty posed by
GC not being completely independent of the corporation).
41. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 956 (2005) (describing a lawyer’s role as ambiguous); Deborah A.
DeMott, The Stages of Scandal and the Roles of General Counsel, 2012 WISC. L. REV. 463,
491-92 (2012) (noting that the GC’s role as gatekeeper and advisor requires foresight);
Duggin, supra note 24, at 993, 1040-41 (summarizing the multi-faceted responsibilities of
GC); Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual Fault Line
in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1089, 1092-93 (2006)
(contrasting a lawyer’s responsibility to his client with his or her responsibilities under
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management, the less they will be able to engage as gatekeepers, let alone
as whistleblowers.42
Overall, given that they have multiple potentially conflicting
objectives (gatekeepers, advocates, transaction engineers, entrepreneurial
and managerial responsibilities, and due-diligence providers), it is not clear
how the GCs will perform as gatekeepers and whistleblowers. Some argue
that whistleblowing function will end up suffering the most unless GCs are
appointed by and report directly to independent board members.43 Others
argue that GCs are able to perform more routine gatekeeping function such
as limiting insider trading by other top officers.44 Conceptual arguments
based on managerial incentives also suggest that the duty that will suffer
the most should be the gatekeeper and whistleblower function.45
Nevertheless, this is an empirical issue and subject of the tests that follow.
C. In-house counsel versus outside corporate counsel and
fragmentation of legal advice
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Y K
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Sarbanes-Oxley).
42. For a discussion of the effects of conflicts of interest between various duties and
responsibilities of GCs, see Chris Armstrong et al., Performance-Based Incentives for
Internal Monitors 2-3 (Rock Center for Corp. Governance Working Paper No. 76, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553116 [https://perma.cc/2V2Y-94KV]; Sung Hui Kim, The
Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
983 (2005); Sung Hui Kim, Inside Lawyers: Friends or Gatekeepers?, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
1867 (2016).
43. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Who Let You into the House?, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 359,
365 (2012).
44. Alan D. Jagolinzer et al., Corporate Governance and the Information Content of
Insider Trades, 49 J. ACCT. RES. 1249, 1249 (2011).
45. See Duggin, supra note 24, at 1030 (suggesting that a GC should resign in the face
of an employer’s violation and subsequent inaction).
46. See, e.g., Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 378, 386-87 (2008) (discussing the effects of fragmented roles between
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Over the past several decades, corporations have hired an increasing
number of lawyers, using both outside law firms as well as in-house
lawyers, with increasing compensation, status, and responsibilities for all
attorneys.
Initially, corporations typically had a single legal firm
responsible for all their legal work. Over time, with competition, this role
got fragmented between the in-house attorneys and outside counsel.
Evidence strongly supports the idea that the in-house attorneys have done
an effective job of taking care of routine tasks, while outside counsel have
been relied upon for specialized skills. This separation resulted in
increasing quality of financial reporting, earnings forecasts, legal
astuteness, and tax avoidance.46
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Another accompanying change put the in-house counsel in a unique
position of representing the firm: becoming part of the management team
and thus becoming the main channel of interaction with outside counsel.
As in-house counsels increased in number, the role of the chief legal
officer—the GC—also changed over the past several decades. GCs
increasingly became members of the board and they became responsible
for basic routine regulatory compliance, risk management, and corporate
ethics.47 At the same time, the managerial influence and responsibilities of
the GCs increased. Top management came to rely on the in-house legal
team for legal strategy rather than rely on external law firms. In-house
lawyers headed by GCs now deal with a range of issues, including legal
strategy, breaches of antitrust laws, breaches of directors’ and officers’
duties, insider trading, fraud, and stock market disclosures.48 GCs are also
involved in formulating and applying corporate governance principles.49
In addition, SOX further contributed to the change in the position of
in-house counsels, since it mandated changes in the structure of publiclytraded companies’ boards.50 As a result, directors’ legal responsibilities
and financial risks increased, thereby increasing the demand for directors
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in-house and attorneys and outside counsel); Justin J. Hopkins et al., Corporate General
Counsel and Financial Reporting Quality, 61 MGMT. SCI. 129, 140 (2015); Jayanthi
Krishnan et al., Legal Expertise on Corporate Audit Committees and Financial Reporting
Quality, 86 ACCT. REV. 2099, 2126 (2011); Byungjin Kwak et al., The Composition of Top
Management with General Counsel and Voluntary Information Disclosure, 54 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 19, 39 (2012); Lubomir P. Litov et al., Lawyers and Fools: Lawyer-Directors in
Public Corporations, 102 GEO. L.J. 413, 472-73 (2014); Beng Wee Goh et al., The Inclusion
of General Counsel in Top Management and Tax Avoidance 34-35 (July 8, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538292
[https://perma.cc/6G5GRSVD]; Adair Morse et al., Executive Lawyers: Gatekeepers or Totems of Governance? 2526
(Mar.
2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2446611
[https://perma.cc/CSA3-87YK]; KPMG INT’L, BEYOND THE LAW: KPMG’S GLOBAL STUDY
OF HOW GENERAL COUNSEL ARE TURNING RISK TO ADVANTAGE 25 (2012),
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2013/01/general-counsel-survey-v5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4P7T-2653].
47. See Duggin, supra note 24, at 1001-23 (discussing the various roles and functions
of GC).
48. See DELOITTE, DELOITTE GLOBAL CORPORATE COUNSEL REPORT: HOW THE GAME IS
CHANGING 2 (Inaugural Global ed. (U.S. Version) 2011), http://s3.amazonaws.com/
zanran_storage/www.deloitte.com/ContentPages/2513816748.pdf [https://perma.cc/M827K5UJ] (listing in its executive summary the role of corporate counsel).
49. See Duggin, supra note 24, at 1026, 1038 (discussing the trend after Enron’s
collapse of corporate counsel establishing internal controls).
50. See, e.g., Melissa Maleske, 8 Ways SOX Changed Corporate Governance, INSIDE
COUNSEL (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/01/01/8-ways-sox-changedcorporate-governance [https://perma.cc/KKG2-ZCU5] (noting the changes to board
structure as one of the ways Sarbanes-Oxley changed corporate governance).
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51. See James S. Linck et al., The Effects of Unintended Consequences of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3287,
3290, 3293, 3320, 3323 (2009).
52. Id. at 3320, 3323.
53. Bost, supra note 41, at 1092.
54. See Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 24, at 477 (“Lawyers are now eager to be seen as
part of the company, rather than as obstacles to getting things done. To do so, it appears
that inside counsel are themselves interested in discounting their gatekeeping function in
corporate affairs.”).
55. Id. at 472 (discussing how the intense pressure to meet business objectives make
gatekeeping and advisory more difficult).
56. Id.
57. See COFFEE, supra note 22 at 225.
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with legal experience.51 Consequently, post-SOX directors are more likely
to be attorneys or consultants than pre-SOX directors.52 The increasing
number of in-house attorneys on boards also meant that boards became
more self-sufficient regarding legal issues and relied less on external law
firms.
Outside counsels were hired by the GCs for their specialized skills
related to a specific transaction. This transactions engineering function
means that, while the outside counsels were more specialized and more
independent to render unbiased advice, they were still outside the firm, had
less information about the client, and could not render holistic advice.
Thus, the separation of in-house and outside counsel roles also
accompanied a fragmentation of legal advice along with a reduced ability
to monitor and provide guidance.
Literature suggests that, given these potential conflicts and roadblocks, some attorneys see their role as “implementers or transaction
engineers,” narrowly focused on a single issue, “rather than as broadlygauged corporate counselors or advisors.”53 Second, in-house attorneys
may be reluctant to constrain managers because they want to be perceived
as a part of the management, rather than as an obstacle in front of the
management.54 It is also difficult for in-house lawyers to separate company
objectives from legal objectives.55 Therefore, they are likely to limit their
gatekeeping functions and defer to management’s judgments about legal
risk.56
Another development also points in the direction of fragmentation.
Surveys indicate that only about 60% of the GCs directly report to the
CEO.57 This means that in about 40% of the firms, the CEOs do not have
direct access to legal advice from their chief legal officer. Inability to
directly access the CEO also means that GCs will not be informed about
the entire enterprise. This fragmentation could be an important factor in
GCs being left out of the information loop. Consequently, they may not be

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 127 Side B

05/11/2017 10:58:06

6_AVCI_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/9/17 5:37 PM

764

[Vol. 19:3

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

informed well enough to suspect that any material wrongdoing is
underway. Overall, there is a lot of evidence that in-house counsels have
created value for the shareholders. There is less agreement as to whether
in-house counsels have reduced corporate crime.58
D. Control mechanisms to deter and detect corporate fraud
Finance literature presents three different perspectives on control
mechanisms that should deter or detect corporate fraud.59 The first
perspective is the legal-control mechanism, which states that corporate
fraud should be investigated and detected by traditional gatekeepers that
are mandated to do so, such as corporate lawyers, auditors, and securities
regulators (represented in the United States by the SEC).60 Another
perspective is the private-litigation mechanism. This perspective states that
private parties injured by the fraud should monitor the corporations for
fraudulent activity.61 The last perspective of monitoring is the financialrisk mechanism. This view suggests that all stakeholders of a company,
such as stockholders, bondholders, analysts, and banks, should monitor the
company; however, the final and responsible monitor should be the
shareholders since they are the residual claimants.62
Previous research provides limited support for the legal and privatelitigation views.63 Market regulators, auditors, and private litigation
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58. Compare Adair Morse et al., supra note 46, at 3 (finding that hiring executive
lawyers—as compared to not hiring executive lawyers—exhibits a fifty percent reduction of
compliance failures and a thirty-two percent reduction of monitoring failures), with
Ribstein, infra note 73, at 19, 32 (casting doubt on the ability of SOX to reduce corporate
crime) and Peter J. Henning, Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 and Corporate Counsel: Who Better
to Prevent Corporate Crime?, 8 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 323 (2004) (explaining limitations
on lawyers’ ability to reduce corporate crime).
59. See Dyck et al., supra note 14, at 2227 (establishing a theoretical framework that
explains three perspectives on how to address corporate fraud).
60. Id.
61. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669-70 (1986) (detailing a common enforcement mechanism for
federal antitrust and securities laws through private attorneys); see also Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Schleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN.
1, 1-2 (2006) (describing three hypotheses, including private litigation for security market
regulation).
62. See Eugene F. Fama, Contract Costs and Financing Decisions, 63 J. BUS. S71,
S88-S89 (1990) (explaining that loan holders and bondholders have an interest in
monitoring companies, but residual risk is borne by equity holders).
63. See Dyck et al., supra note 14, at 2230 (highlighting that only 3% of fraud is
exposed by plaintiff’s lawyers through private litigation).
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lawyers are more successful in detecting fraud relative to shareholders.64
Non-financial market regulators detected 13% of the detected fraud cases,
media detected 13%, the SEC detected less than 7%, and law firms
detected only 3%.65 In contrast, employees are the largest group of fraud
detectors, accounting for 17% of the whistleblowing cases.66 The internal
governance mechanism covers less than 30% of all whistleblowing cases,
while external whistleblowing comes mostly from non-financial industry
agents.67 Among external whistleblowers, private litigation appears to be
more successful in detecting fraud than public litigation sources (i.e., the
SEC).68
Evidence on the types of whistleblowers indicates that access costs of
private information, career-building opportunities, and monetary awards
are major determinants of whistleblowing.69 Anyone blowing the whistle
on large-scale fraud can win significant monetary awards. The success of
employees appears to be due to the low costs associated with accessing
information to discover the fraud, since employees can access the necessary
private information for fraud detection at low or zero cost.70 Journalists
have some private information advantages and can enjoy great career
advancement opportunities after they blow the whistle on important cases.71
On the other hand, auditors not only fail to gain from whistleblowing, but
can lose a significant portion of their business as a result.72 Therefore, they
do not have as strong an incentive to blow the whistle.
SOX implicitly assumes that corporate fraud can be detected and
prevented through regulatory channels. Consequently, SOX is designed to
increase transparency, accountability, and sanctions; however, it comes at
significant compliance costs for public firms. One view opposing SOX is
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64. Id. at 2225.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An
Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 759-63 (2003) (noting the SEC’s lack of resources “to
achieve the optimal amount of amount of detection, enforcement, and deterrence of financial
frauds,” and noting the supplemental efforts of private litigants).
69. See Dyck et al., supra note 14, at 2231-48 (detailing the various advantages,
disadvantages, and nuances of the specific groups of whistleblowers and their comparative
advantage relative to other groups).
70. Id. at 2240 (highlighting that employees have the best access to information largely
because their participation is vital to some frauds); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of
Knowledge in Society, 34 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20 (1945).
71. See Dyck et al., supra note 14, 2239-40 (noting that whistleblowing journalists are
much more likely to release their name when whistleblowing and are more likely to get
promotions shortly after whistleblowing).
72. See id. at 2232-35.
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that the compliance costs of SOX exceed its benefits, thereby making
society worse off even if it leads to greater fraud detection.73 A second
view is that regulatory enforcement is not the main channel that controls
corporate fraud. Instead, private actions, shareholder monitoring, and
takeovers are important channels to control corporate fraud.74 However,
SOX has not addressed strengthening shareholder involvement in fraud
detection and prevention. This idea of shareholder involvement is
accredited to Professor Eugene Fama,75 but it is only partly supported by
empirical evidence.76
Evidence of the effect of SOX on fraud reduction is mixed.77 In the
post-SOX era, auditors identified more fraud, analysts identified about the
same, yet employees detected less fraud than in the pre-SOX era.78 The
decline in whistleblowing for the most important segment (employees)
suggests that, while SOX is effective in protecting employees from being
fired, it is ineffective against loss of career advancement opportunities or
even as a shield against harassment.79 This evidence indicates that more
needs to be done for fraud detection and prevention.
E. Relation to insider trading literature
Our paper also expands upon the literature on insider trading.
Previous research has shown that insiders trade profitably. They buy when
they have positive nonpublic information and sell when they have negative,
nonpublic information. The ability of insiders to trade profitably is directly
related to their position and responsibility within the firm: Top executives
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73. See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2002) (describing the costs
associated with SOX as perverse managerial incentives, increasing distrust and bureaucracy
in firms, and impeding information flows).
74. See id. (“The only effective antidotes to fraud are active and vigilant markets and
professionals with strong incentives to investigate corporate managers and dig up corporate
information.”).
75. See Dyck et al., supra note 14, at 2214, 2227 (pointing out that Fama predicts that
monitoring will be done by those parties with residual claims—equity and debt holders).
76. Id. at 2214, 2230 (finding that debt holders are absent in fraud detection and equity
holders only discover 3%).
77. Id. at 2249 (discussing the impact of SOX on various groups’ incentives to report
fraud).
78. Id. at 2249-50 (showing that auditors’ fraud detection increased from 6% to 18%,
analysts’ fraud detection stayed the same, and employees’ fraud detection decreased from
18% to 13%).
79. Id. at 2245 (telling the story of an employee who, despite a successful career, will
never be employed in that field again as a result of the common costs of whistleblowing:
“distancing and retaliation from fellow workers and friends, personal attacks on one’s
character during the course of a protracted dispute, and the need to change one’s career”).
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typically earn a higher rate of return than officers and directors, who also
earn a higher rate of return than outside large shareholders.80
Consequently, access to privileged information directly arises as a result of
day-to-day activities of the top executives.
In this paper, we utilize the fact that insiders trade profitably to infer
what insiders and GCs know about SCAs. If insiders increase their
purchasing, we infer that they possess positive information. If insiders
increase their selling, we infer that they possess negative information.
We analyze the profitability of GCs not only in the firms with SCAs
but in all other firms as well. We compare the profitability of GCs with
other top-level executives. To the extent that GCs make similar trading
profits as the rest of top-level executives outside of the SCA periods, we
gauge the level of involvement and responsibilities of GCs within the firm
to be similar to those of other top-level executives such as CEOs, CFOs,
and chairmen of the board. On the other hand, if we find that, in general,
GCs make less trading profits than the fellow top executives but similar to
officers and directors, this finding would tell us that the level of
responsibility of GCs would be comparable to that of other directors or
officers.
Another strand of the literature ties the profitability of insider trading
to corporate governance and internal control mechanisms.81 Comparing the

05/11/2017 10:58:06

C M
Y K

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 129 Side A

80. See, e.g., Arturo Bris, Do Insider Trading Laws Work?, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 267,
271 (2005) (explaining how acquiring private information can lead to insiders reaping
economic benefits); John E. Core et al., Stock Market Anomalies: What Can We Learn from
Repurchases and Insider Trading?, 11 REV. OF ACCT. STUD. 49, 49 (2006) (“[M]anagers’
repurchase and insider trading behavior varies consistently with the information underlying
the operating accruals trading strategy.”); Bin Ke et al., What Insiders Know About Future
Earnings and How They Use It: Evidence from Insiders’ Trade, 35 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315,
315 (2003) (describing how insiders increasingly sell stock between three and nine quarters
prior to a break in a string of consecutive increases in quarterly earnings, but do not
abnormally sell in the two quarters immediately preceding the break); Albert S. Kyle,
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315, 1315 (1985) (“The
insider makes positive profits by exploiting his monopoly power optimally in a dynamic
context.”); H. Nejat Seyhun & Michael Bradley, Corporate Bankruptcy and Insider
Trading, 70 J. BUS. 189, 203, 214 (1997) (showing that on average, top executives inside
trade a significantly larger monetary value than other insiders); H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders’
Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 210 (1986)
(describing how real high-level executives are more successful predictors of future
abnormal stock price changes than lower-level officers or shareholders); H. Nejat Seyhun,
The Information Content of Aggregate Insider Trading, 61 J. BUS. 1, 22 (1988) (detailing
that insiders tend to buy more stock prior to increases in the value of the stock on the market
and sell more stock prior to decreases in stock price on the market); H. Nejat Seyhun, Why
Does Aggregate Insider Trading Predict Future Stock Returns?, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1302, 1329
(1992) (“The evidence presented in this study documents a strong relation between past
aggregate insider trading and future excess stock returns.”).
81. See, e.g., Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting
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profitability of insider trading in firms with large financial settlements to a
broad set of control groups allows us to examine the relationship between
the profitability of insider trading in firms with both good and deficient
control mechanisms and corporate governance structures.
Finally, a word of caution. Given that we analyze the level and
profitability of insider trading by GCs for SCA-involved firms, our results
are only strictly applicable to the firms that end up in our sample. If a firm
is not involved in a SCA, then it is not in our sample and strictly speaking
we cannot comment on the degree to which the GCs may have played a
role in preventing the corporation from being sued in the first place. To
shed more light on this issue, we do examine the sensitivity of our results to
the settlement amounts paid later in the paper.
II.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

A. Data
This study analyzes the insider trading activities of top executives,
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Scandals, 68 J. L. & ECON. 371, 403 (2005) (detailing that one mechanism of corporate
governance, a firm whose audit committee includes a financial expert as required by SOX,
has a significantly lower probability of restating its earnings); S. Burcu Avci et al., Ending
Executive Manipulations of Incentive Compensation, 42 J. CORP. L. 277, 280 (2016) (noting
that executives use their roles to increase their compensation by using manipulative devices
such as backdating, bullet-dodging, and spring-loading); S. Burcu Avci et al., Manipulative
Games of Gifts by Corporate Executives, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1131, 1132 (2016) (detailing
that corporate insiders make favorable donations right before a steep decline in the
company’s share price, even though if the donations are made at a time when a sale of the
same stock would have been illegal); Taylan Mavruk & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do SEC’s 10b5-1
Safe Harbor Rules Need To Be Rewritten?, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 133, 153 (2016)
(comparing the percentage of sales and purchases with 10b5-1 designations over time);
Enrichetta Ravina & Paola Sapienza, What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from
Their Trading, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 962, 1001 (2010) (finding that governance quality
impacts both the profitability of insider trading as well as widens the gap for abnormal
returns between low and high governance companies); Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat
Seyhun, Defining “Material, Nonpublic”: What Should Constitute Illegal Insider
Information?, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 327, 332 (2016) (noting that because of
vague insider trading laws, insiders have been able to trade on material, nonpublic
information by buying and selling shares before public disclosures through Form 8-K
filings, without facing legal consequences); Hollis A. Skaife et al., Internal Control over
Financial Reporting and Managerial Rent Extraction: Evidence from the Profitability of
Insider Trading, 55 J. ACCT. & ECON. 91, 107 (2013) (summarizing that firms with weaker
internal controls generally have larger profits on insider trading); Scott L. Summers & John
T. Sweeney, Fraudulently Misstated Financial Statements and Insider Trading: An
Empirical Analysis, 73 ACCT. REV. 131, 144 (1998) (expounding that fraud companies have
significantly more inventory relative to sales, are growing faster, and have a higher return on
assets than no-fraud companies in the year prior to the occurrence of the fraud).
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GCs, and other officials in the companies listed in Stanford Law School’s
and Cornerstone Research’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse
(“SCAC”).82 The SCAC has tracked more than 4,000 class action lawsuits
filed in Federal Court since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995.83
A SCA contains allegations that the company or its managers violated
at least one federal or state securities law that caused damages for a number
of parties. A case is called a class action because the number of injured
parties is so numerous that it is not practical to adjudicate each case
separately. Furthermore, commonality of interest is required to call a case
a class action and plaintiffs must demonstrate that the claims of the
representatives of the class are typical of every class member.84
The period of analysis of the study is 1996–2014, a dataset that
contains 4,041 filed cases. Since law firms automatically file class action
lawsuits if any large negative shock occurs in share prices, it is not likely
that any large class-action lawsuit would be excluded in this file.85 After
getting data from the SCAC, we applied various filters to get rid of small or
frivolous cases. First, we eliminated the cases that were dismissed or
ongoing. After the first round of elimination, we had 2,054 cases left in the
dataset. Second, we eliminated cases with a settlement amount below $25
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82. Securities Class Action Clearinghouse: A Collaboration With Cornerstone
Research,
STAN.
LAW
SCH.,
http://securities.stanford.edu/index.html
[https://perma.cc/9GLZ-PTRH] (last visited Mar. 21, 2017) [hereinafter “SCAC”].
83. About The SCAC, STAN. LAW SCH., http://securities.stanford.edu/about-thescac.html#about [https://perma.cc/G6CR-FEPG] (last visited Mar. 21, 2017).
84. Rules 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the
requirements for class certification. Rule 23(a) sets forth four threshold requirements for
class certification, each of which must be met: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
class members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class (commonality); (3) the claims or defenses of the class representatives are typical
of those of the class (typicality); and (4) the class representatives will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class (adequacy). See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (showing that courts
have added additional requirements: The courts require (1) that a definable class exists, (2)
the named representatives are members of that class, and (3) the claim of the class is live,
rather than moot); Jeffrey S. Gutman, 7.2 Rule 23 Class Certification Requirements,
SHRIVER CTR., http://www.federalpracticemanual.org/node/42 [https://perma.cc/PLM7CGQK] (last updated 2016).
85. See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 46 (2009) (describing how plaintiff’s attorneys use
price drops in stock as an initial screen in selecting which companies to sue); see also Paul
A. Griffin et al., Stock Price Response to News of Securities Fraud Litigation: Market
Efficiency and the Slow Diffusion of Costly Information 2 (Stan. L. Sch. John M. Olin
Program in L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 208, 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=251766 [https://perma.cc/9Q26-C76R] (discussing the first step for
plaintiff’s attorneys is to analyze stock price declines to see if support could be found for
filing a complaint).
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million. We chose a sizable minimum settlement amount to ensure that the
fraud and estimated damages were sufficiently large and that insiders
would take into account the anticipated stock price effects. For these large
settlement cases, the median settlement amount represented about 1.1% of
the estimated damages.86 Based on these numbers, the estimated damages
for the minimum settlement amount are about $2.3 billion.
Applying the $25 million minimum settlement filter left us with only
169 cases. Third, we eliminated a few companies that are traded privately
and did not match with CRSP CUSIP number and name.87 Fourth, we
eliminated companies that had no open market transactions by insiders in
our insider trading database. In the end, we were left with a sample size of
131 companies.
We collected insider trading data from Thomson Reuters (TFN)88 for
the analysis period. The dataset contains the volume and amount of sales
and purchases of insider trading. The database comprises the legallymandated reporting of all insider transactions.89 We used the information
on insider trading of top executives, GCs, and other officers. Top
executives, directors, other officers, and GCs are classified using role codes
in the TFN database. Top executives are limited to officer and director
(‘OD’), officer, director, and beneficial owner (‘H’), chairman of the board
(‘CB’), CEO (‘CEO’), CFO (‘CFO’), controlling person (‘CP’), general
partner (‘GP’), and president (‘P’). General counsels are coded with ‘GC.’
Directors and other officers are defined as all other officers.90 We included
any large shareholder with any officer title. We excluded outside large
shareholders (‘SH’) and outside beneficial owners of more than 10% of a
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86. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS 2013
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 9 (2014), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/19962013/Settlements-Through-12-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB6S-2C7C].
87. CRSP stands for Center for Research in Security Prices, which is one of twelve
Research and Learning Centers at Chicago Booth that provides data for scholarly research in
finance, economics and related disciplines. CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN SECURITY PRICES,
http://www.crsp.com/about-crsp [https://perma.cc/S832-H8ME] (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).
CUSIP numbers refer to unique eight-digit alphanumeric identification numbers assigned to
all publicly listed securities by the Committee for Uniform Security Identification
Procedures.
See What’s Behind a CUSIP Number?, CUSIP GLOB. SERVS.,
https://www.cusip.com/cusip/index.htm [https://perma.cc/XK77-H7B5] (describing the
CUSIP number process).
88. See WHARTON RES. DATA SERVS., https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/
[https://perma.cc/GJ7X-MZET] (last visited Mar. 21, 2017) (introducing homepage for tools
and resources available on the website).
89. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p, Section 16(a) (listing
the mandated disclosures for insider trading).
90. Insider trading data can be purchased from Thomson Reuters. See Thomson
Reuters, WHARTON RES. DATA SERVS., http://www.whartonwrds.com /datasets/thomsonreuters-2/ [https://perma.cc/6BW2-7HBS] (last updated Aug. 25, 2011).
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class security (‘B’). These outside groups are typically hurt by corporate
fraud and thus are not likely to be aware of any ongoing corporate fraud.
As a next step, we combined the SCAC information and the insider
trading information and were left with the insider trading activities of
companies which were involved in fraud settlements after the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.91 As control periods, we
constructed pre-class and post-class periods that are the same number of
days as the class period. Hence, if the class period is 200 days, then the
pre-class period would also comprise of 200 days that would end one day
before the beginning of the class period. Similarly, the post-class period
would also be 200 days that start from the end of the class period. We
tested the timing of insider trading activities for the pre-class period before
the class action starts, during the class action period, and for the post-class
period. We also compared the results with the insider trading activities of
companies which are not involved in fraudulent activities.
Table 1A displays sample characteristics of insider trading in all firms
in the CRSP database between 1996 and 2014. This Table provides
information about trades of different insider groups in the whole sample.
Purchases and sales are reported separately. We also classified companies
into three categories: Small-cap firms are ones with less than a $1 billion
market capitalization, mid-cap firms are ones with a market capitalization
between $1 billion and $5 billion, and large-cap firms have higher than $5
billion market capitalization.
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91. See generally Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 10467, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (establishing legal
framework for private securities litigation).
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The table shows that the number of firms involved in insider trading
and number of trades decrease with market capitalization, while the
average trade size increases with market capitalization. It is worth
considering the differences in number of trades: 894,623 share purchases
versus 2,862,353 share sales realized during the analysis period. Hence,
sales are about three times more frequent than purchases. The ratio of
number of shares purchased to number of shares sold is also dependent on
firm size. In small-cap firms, this purchase-to-sale ratio equals sixty-one
percent (9.7 billion shares purchased to 16.0 billion shares sold). In midcap firms, this ratio falls to about twelve percent (1.2 billion shares
purchased to 10.1 shares billion sold). In large-cap firms, the purchase-tosale ratio falls further to 4.8% (465.2 million shares purchased to 9.6 billion
shares sold).
The ratio of purchases to sales follows similar patterns for officers,
directors, and top executives. However, the pattern of GCs’ trades is
different: The GCs tend to sell about eighty-five times more shares than
they buy (16.5 million shares purchased to 1.4 billion shares sold). This
pattern indicates that GCs typically sell the shares they receive from the
corporation as incentive compensation.
Table 1B displays additional sample characteristics of insider trading
with firms with securities fraud settlement during the same period (1996
through 2014). The total number of firms with insider trading in the
dataset is 131. The number of firms and the number of trades increase
along with market capitalization of firms. These numbers show that there
is more insider trading activity in big, SCA-settled firms. The average
class period is around 600 calendar days, or a little over 1.5 years. The
class period appears to be slightly shorter in smaller firms.
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92. The ratio of settlements to damages is about one percent for large settlements. See
Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Actions Settlements, http://securities.stanford.edu/
research-reports/1996-2015/Settlements-Through-12-2015-Review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M8JP-WJ3B] (analyzing securities class action settlements).
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The average settlement amount increases monotonically with firm
size. This finding indicates that larger firms with deeper pockets tend to
settle for larger amounts. In small-cap stocks, the average settlement
amount is around $60 million to $90 million. In large-cap stocks, this
amount grows to about $280 million, while the overall average settlement
is about $170 million.
The number of sales is 31,704 shares, which is about ten times as large
as the number of purchases, namely 3012 shares. Compared to the overall
sample, firms with SCA settlements have a greater sale-purchase ratio,
more than ten as compared to the overall sample, which is about three in
Panel A.
The average size for purchases is higher than the average size of sales,
50,000 shares versus 21,000 shares in firms with SCA settlements. Thus,
we can say that insiders in SCA companies sell in small amounts, while
their sales are more frequent than their purchases.
Using the ratio of settlements to damages, we can also compute an
approximate figure for stakeholder damages. Based on these settlement
amounts, the estimated range of damages caused by the alleged fraud is
between $6 billion to $30 billion.92 These damage amounts are very large
and indicate that they likely involve substantial stock price effects.
Table 1A also shows that the total sales exceed total purchases by a
factor of seven ($660 billion in sales to $90 billion in purchases). Similar
patterns are observed for officers, top executives, and GCs, with increasing
sales-to-purchase ratio. For top executives, the sales-to-purchase ratio is
around nine ($227 billion in sales to $25 billion in purchases) and around
thirty for GCs ($4.3 billion in purchases to $130 million in sales). Our
results indicate that GCs in SCA-settled firms are more aggressive sellers
compared to top executives, officers, and directors.
Tables 1C, 1D, and 1E compare insider trading for the pre-Class,
Class, and post-Class periods. Overall insider sales increase more than
fifty percent during the Class period as compared to the pre-Class Period.
During the pre-Class period, insiders have sold $215 million shares (Table
1B). During the Class Period, insider sales reach over $350 million shares,
an increase of 63%. This increased selling is consistent with the hypothesis
that insiders are aware of the overvaluation of their common stock and that
they are acting proactively to reduce their potential losses by reducing their
holdings. Table 1B and Table 1C show that the increase in sales holds for
each insider group. The number of shares sold increased 116% for officers
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and directors, 13% for top executives, and 91% for GC.
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During the post-Class Period, insider selling declines substantially. In
Table 1D, insider selling equals ninety-five million shares. This represents
a decline of more than seventy percent from 350 million shares sold during
the Class period. Furthermore, selling declines for every insider group.
The decline equals 80% for officers and directors (from 219.5 million to
44.3 million), 61% for top executives (from 128.7 million to 49.8 million),
and 48% for the GC (from 2.5 million to 1.3 million).
While not shown here, we also explore insiders’ trading patterns
before and after SOX. We find similar purchase and sales patterns both
before and after SOX. For all three insiders groups, insiders increase their
sales from the pre-Class period to the Class period, and then reduce their
sales during the post-Class period. Hence, our finding indicates that SOX
has not changed insider trading patterns.
Overall, the fact that sales first increase substantially from the preClass period to the Class period and then decline substantially during the
post-Class Period is consistent with the hypothesis that all three groups of
insiders are aware of the implications of SCA allegations on their own
firms’ stock prices. To reduce their potential losses from overvalued
shares, insiders sell during the Class period. During the post-Class Period,
stock prices are closer to fundamental values and the need to sell shares is
reduced. Next, we analyze the profitability of insider trading patterns
during the Pre-Class, Class and post-Class Periods.
B. Measuring Insiders’ Abnormal Stock Profits

ARi,t = (   
Where ri,t is the return to stock i that insiders have traded for day t, and
rm,t is the return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of all NYSE,
AMEX, NASDAQ, and ARCA for day following the insider trading day.
Next, we compute insiders’ abnormal profits, AP, for each day around the
insider trading day:
APi,t = H* (   
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To compute insiders’ abnormal profits, we normalize insiders’ trades
by multiplying insiders’ abnormal returns with one for insiders’ purchases
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First, we run a standard event study analysis to determine abnormal
returns using our sample companies. Event date (day zero) is the insider
trading date for each trade. We measure abnormal returns, AR, around
insiders’ trades by computing the market-adjusted daily stock returns.
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and negative one for insiders’ sales. Hence, the parameter H takes the
value 1 for insiders’ purchases and -1 for insiders’ sales. Abnormal
profitability is measured relative to market movements. Thus, following
insiders’ purchases, insiders are deemed to make an abnormal profit if the
stock price increases more than the increase in the market return. If the
stock market falls, then to be deemed abnormally profitable, insiders’ stock
must fall less than the market. Following insiders’ sales, insiders are
deemed to make an abnormal profit if the stock price falls more than the
fall in market return. If the stock market rises, then to be deemed
abnormally profitable, insiders’ stock price must rise less than the market.
We then cumulate insiders’ abnormal profits around insiders’ transactions
over longer-window horizons, T.
CAPi,T =


 

     

CAPi,T represents cumulative abnormal profits over T days before or
following the insider trading day, ri,t is the return to stock i for day t, and rm,t
is the return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of all NYSE, AMEX,
NASDAQ, and ARCA for day t following the insider trading day. We
compute cumulative abnormal returns for 10-, 20-, 50-, 100-, 200-, and
250-day holding periods in order to follow patterns in return around each
insider trading date. For comparison purposes, we also measure abnormal
price movements prior to the insider trading day.
III.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 136 Side A

We provide the main results of our paper in this section. Table 2
displays insiders’ abnormal profits computed in non-litigation firms
between 1996 and 2014. All three groups of insiders trade profitably. Our
database contains over two million trades for officers. Following these
transactions, officers and directors earn about 4.1% in abnormal returns.
For top executives, our database contains over one million trades.
Following these trades, top executives earn about 5.6%. Finally, our
database contains over 63,000 trades for the GCs. Following these trades,
the GCs earn about 3.6%. Abnormal returns for all event periods are
statistically at about the one percent level for officers, top executives, and
GCs. Overall, GCs’ profits are comparable to those of officers and
directors.

05/11/2017 10:58:06

C M
Y K

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 136 Side B

05/11/2017 10:58:06

6_AVCI_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/9/17 5:37 PM

782

[Vol. 19:3

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 136 Side B
05/11/2017 10:58:06

C M
Y K

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 137 Side A

05/11/2017 10:58:06

6_AVCI_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/9/17 5:37 PM

2017]WHY DON’T GENERAL COUNSELS STOP CORPORATE CRIME?

783

Next, we turn our attention to SCA-settled firms. Table 3 displays
insiders’ abnormal profits in firms subject to securities fraud lawsuits
between 1996 and 2014 that resulted in settlements. We examine insider
trading separately before the Class Period, during the Class Period, and
after the Class Period. The first column shows number of observations in
each period. As expected, number of insider trading by GCs is comparably
less than that of officers and top executives since there is only one GC in
each firm.
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Examining the number of transactions, we see that insider trading is
more numerous during the Class Period as compared to pre-Class or postClass periods even though the lengths of the periods are identical. This
finding indicates that for SCA-settled firms, Class Period represents a
period of greater information asymmetry and therefore a period that is
offering potentially greater profitability as compared to pre- or post-Class
periods. While this pattern holds for all three insider groups, it is especially
true for the GC group, again suggesting that the source of information
asymmetry has legal connotations.
We analyze insider profitability next. The first three lines of Table 3
show the abnormal returns from insider trading of officers and directors
before, during, and after the class period. Pre-class period results are not
significant for 6741 insider transactions. During the Class period, officer
and directors increase the number of trades to 9466. The abnormal
profitability of officers and directors’ transactions during the Class period
reach as high as 29.4% during the 250 days after insider trading day.
Further, officer and directors’ transactions display statistically abnormal
profitability immediately after the insider trading day. This finding
indicates that officers and directors do not refrain from trading close to the
revelation of the material nonpublic information. During the post-Class
Period, officers and directors execute 3846 transactions. Profitability of
officer and directors’ transactions continue in this period, with abnormal
profits reaching about 28.4% after 250 days.
Top executives’ profitability is shown in the next three rows. PreClass period results are not significant for 3,887 transactions by top
executives. During the Class period, top executives increase their number
of trades to 6,644. The abnormal profitability of top executives’ profits
during the Class period reach as high as 21.9% during the 250 after insider
trading day. Further, top executives’ transactions display statistically
abnormal profitability immediately after the insider trading day. This
finding indicates that top executives also do not refrain from trading close
to the revelation of the material nonpublic information. During the postClass period, top executives engaged in 2,490 transactions. Profitability of
top executives’ transactions continued in this period, with abnormal profits
reaching about 41.7% after 250 days. Once again, top executives’
transactions display statistically abnormal profitability immediately after
the insider trading day.
Finally, GCs’ trading profitability is shown in the last three rows. Preclass period abnormal returns are negative and significant for 260
transactions by GCs. Hence, GCs do not trade profitably prior to the Class
period.
During the Class period, GCs increased the number of trades to 1300,
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which is a four-fold increase from the pre-Class period. GCs’ abnormal
profitability during the Class period reach as high as 17.7% during the 250
days after insider trading day. However, GCs’ abnormal profits do not
attain statistical significance until about 200 days after the insider trading
day. This evidence indicates that GCs trade more intensely, based on
material nonpublic information as well as in advance of the material
nonpublic information.
During the post-Class period, GCs engaged in only 69 transactions.
Profitability of GCs’ transactions occurs early, immediately after the
insider trading day. For long horizon windows, the abnormal profits are
not significant.
To explore the timing issues in more detail, insiders’ abnormal profits
during the pre-Class periods, Class periods and post-Class periods for all
three groups of insiders are also plotted in Figures 1, 2, and 3. In Figure 1,
abnormal profits fall for all three groups prior to the insider trading day.
Following the insider trading day, abnormal profits remain flat or continue
to fall. This figure indicates that, while insiders tend to buy shares after
price falls and sell shares after price increases, there are no systematic price
movements following the insider trading day that would create abnormal
profits. Thus, for our sample of SCA-settled firms, the pre-Class period
does not seem to offer profitable trading opportunities for any group of
insiders.
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Figure 2 shows the price patterns for the Class periods for all three
groups of insiders. The V-shaped figure around the insider trading day
indicates that stock prices rise abnormally prior to insiders’ sales and they
fall abnormally after insiders’ sales. Similarly, stock prices fall abnormally
prior to insiders’ purchases and rise abnormally following insiders’
purchases. Thus, insiders buy at low prices and they sell at high prices, and
they avoid the loss associated with the subsequent fall in process.
From Figure 2, for officers and directors, stock prices rise abnormally
about 15% prior to the sale day and they fall abnormally about 30% after
the sale days. For top executives, stock prices rise abnormally about 25%
prior to the sale day and they fall abnormally about 22% after the sale day.
Finally for GCs, stock prices rise abnormally about 40% prior to the sale
day and they fall abnormally about 18% after the sale day. These findings
indicate that GCs time their sales to occur soon after the stock prices have
peaked.
Figure 2 also indicates that for officers and directors as well as top
executives, insider transactions become profitable immediately.
In
contrast, GCs’ transactions do not attain profitability for about 80 trading
days (about four calendar months) after insider trading day. This finding
indicates that GCs tend to execute their sales transactions earlier in the
Class period as compared to the other executives.
Post-Class period abnormal profits are shown in Figure 3 for all three
groups of insiders. This figure is mostly similar to Figure 2. Insiders are
able to time their purchases and sales during the post-Class periods to make
abnormal profits as well.
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Next, we separate insiders’ transactions into purchases and sales and
examine their profitability separately. These results are shown in Tables
4A and 4B. As one can see from these Tables, the profitability of insider
trading during the Class period is driven by sales only. Insiders’ purchases
during the Class period are not profitable for any of the three insider
groups. Typically, insiders’ purchases do become positive and statistically
significant during the pre-Class period for officers and post-Class period
for the GCs. In contrast, sales are highly profitable during the Class Period
for all three groups of insiders. In addition, insiders’ sales are also
profitable for officers and top executives during the post-Class period.
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Next, we examine the relation profitability of insider trading and
volume of trading. For officers and directors, these relations are shown in
Table 5A. The general finding from the literature is that profitability of
insider trading increases with increases in insider trading knowledge as
insiders trade greater volumes of stock on more precise information.93 One
concern here is that insiders might worry about trading larger volumes
when they have more precise information since these transactions can
increase the likelihood that they would be named as defendants in a
subsequent lawsuit. Hence whether insiders in SCA-settled firms trade
large amounts when they have more precise information is an open
question.
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93. See, e.g., H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders’ Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market
Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 210 (1986) at 204-06.
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Examining Table 5A, we see that profitability of officers and directors
transactions in fact do not increase monotonically during the Class period.
Officers and directors earn 36.5% when they trade less than 1,000 shares,
24.3% when they trade between 1,000 and 10,000 shares, and 27.2% when
they trade greater than 10,000 shares. This finding is consistent with risk
aversion hypothesis.
The relation between profitability and trading volume for top
executives is shown in Table 5B. For top executives, abnormal profits
during the Class period increase monotonically. Top executives earn
16.3% when they trade less than 1,000 shares, 27.1% when they trade
between 1,000 and 10,000 shares, and 35.1% when they trade greater than
10,000 shares. These results suggest that top executives do not appear to
worry about increased likelihood of being subject to a lawsuit.
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Finally, we examine the abnormal profitability for GCs. The relation
between profitability and trading volume for GCs is shown in Table 5C.
GCs do not earn a statistically significant profit when they trade less than
1,000 shares during the Class period. Their profits rise to 31.3% when they
trade between 1,000 and 10,000 shares and then level off to 26.3% when
they trade more than 10,000 shares. However, there are only 28 such
observations with more than 10,000 shares traded during the Class period.
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Overall, our evidence indicates that top executives do trade larger
volumes when they have more precise information during the Class period.
For GCs, profitability generally increases with greater trading volumes;
however, the relation is not monotonic. Our evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that GCs do worry about being subject to a greater probability
of being named a defendant in case of a lawsuit and they hold back trading
very aggressively.
Next, we analyze the impact that SOX may have had on insider
trading behavior of SCA-settled firms. These results are shown in Tables
6A and 6B. Our evidence indicates that SOX did not affect the profitable
trading behavior of insiders during the Class period. For the pre-SOX
period, all three groups of insiders trade profitably during the Class period.
Similarly, for the post-SOX period, all three groups of insiders continue to
trade profitably for the Class period. Our evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that SOX has been ineffective in controlling profitable trading
behavior of any group of insiders.
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As a sensitivity test, we also examine profitability of insider trading
for smaller settlements. For this purpose, we used $3 million to $25
million settlements. There was a total of 307 firms that fit this criterion.
These results are shown in Table 7. Our evidence in Table 7 indicates
that even for smaller settlements, insiders as well as the GCs continue to
trade profitably. Comparing our larger-settlement results in Table 3 with
smaller settlement results in Table 7, we observe that profitability of insider
trading actually increases for smaller settlements for all three groups of
insiders. One possible explanation for these results is that insiders may be
viewing the costs of profitable trading to be smaller in smaller settlement
cases. As a consequence, all three groups of insiders are taking more
aggressive trading positions to exploit their asymmetric information.
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While not shown separately, our results also indicate that all three
groups of insiders sell much more heavily during the Class periods than
they do during the pre-Class or post-Class periods for the expanded sample.
Overall, our evidence shows that GCs behave similarly to other top
executives even in firms with smaller settlements. Hence, our results are
more general that just the firms with large settlements. These findings
further corroborate the conclusion that, in general, GCs act in concert with
other top executives.
IV.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
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94. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
95. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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Our evidence suggests that the lack of action on the part of GCs in
stopping corporate wrongdoing is not the lack of access to top-level
information. Instead, our evidence indicates that GCs act in concert with
the other top executives and that they are aware of the corporate
wrongdoing. To gain greater cooperation from the GC’s office, we suggest
the following policy recommendations.
Our first recommendation is that the whistleblowing protections for
GCs might be strengthened to encourage GCs not to be tempted into fraud
in the first place and to gain greater cooperation from GCs to actively stop
corporate fraud. Currently, there is ambiguity about whether GCs are
covered by the whistleblowing protections afforded to other employees.
Including the GCs under this protection will encourage more GCs to step
forward and stop corporate wrongdoing before it engulfs the entire firm.
This might include an explicit SEC rule stating that corporate counsel are
covered by the whistleblowing protections that are available to other
employees.94
We suggest a second policy response should be to remove the
exemption granted to corporate counsels by the PSLRA and to allow a
private right of action for noncompliance of SOX provisions against
GCs.95 By allowing a private right of action against the GCs, the costs of
passively watching corporate fraud take hold will be increased.
Consequently, we would expect more GCs to actively stop corporate
wrongdoing.
We suggest that a third policy response should be the creation of an
independent corporate counsel tasked with the sole responsibility as a
gatekeeper. This could mimic the function of an internal auditor, protected
with similar authority and responsibilities.
We would expect the
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gatekeeper counsel to report directly to the independent board members
instead of the CEO. An additional policy response can include mandated
hiring of outside legal-audit firms similar to independent financial audit
firms.
Our last policy recommendation is for the SEC to ban any GC of any
SCA-settled firm from representing any client in any SEC business. This
blanket ban will ensure that, even if in some cases the GC was not aware of
the fraud, they would be encouraged to be more vigilant in seeking out
potential wrongdoing. Consequently, such a ban should be effective in
encouraging more GCs to actively stop corporate wrongdoing.
CONCLUSIONS

96. . 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002); Securities and Exchange Commission’s Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the
Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7. Rule 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 states:

05/11/2017 10:58:06

If an attorney, appearing and practicing before the Commission in the
representation of an issuer, becomes aware of evidence of a material violation
by the issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or agent of the issuer, the
attorney shall report such evidence to the issuer’s chief legal officer (or the
equivalent thereof) or to both the issuer’s chief legal officer and its chief
executive officer (or the equivalents thereof) forthwith.
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In this article, we investigate the potential reasons for the failure of
corporate counsels to report and prevent corporate crime. Since corporate
attorneys are well-versed in law and they are expected to use their legal
expertise to advise, intervene, and stop wrongdoing, SOX has designated
corporate attorneys as a special gatekeeper. SOX imposed requirements on
corporate attorneys to report any violation to the chief legal officer or chief
executive officer and if the response from these officers is inadequate, then
to the board of directors in order to stop any potential wrongdoing.96
We formulate two mutually exclusive hypotheses to characterize
corporate counsels’ lack of actions in stopping corporate wrongdoing. The
first hypothesis is that fraudulent top-level executives intentionally keep the
corporate counsels out of the information loop. As a result, in-house
lawyers are generally unaware of the developing violations and therefore
unable to report and prevent fraud. Thus, the corporate counsels cannot
fulfill their gatekeeping role since they simply do not have the information
about the potential wrongdoings.
A second hypothesis is that in-house corporate counsels are actually
present at the scene of the crime. They participate in planning, creation,
execution, or cover-up of the fraud alongside other top management. This

17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).
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hypothesis states that corporate counsels are well aware of the fraud. In
this case, corporate lawyers would have no incentive to report the fraud
since they would be turning themselves in by reporting.
Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that GCs are aware of
the corporate wrongdoing. Insider trading behavior of GCs is similar to
other top-level executives. GCs are heavy sellers of their own firm’s stocks
during the Class periods and they profit abnormally by avoiding the stock
price declines upon revelation of the fraud at the end of the Class periods.
Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the GCs are part of the
fraudulent group and therefore they should be treated the same.
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